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Is the prohibition against torture and cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment absolute in international human rights 




In a recent article, Steven Greer questions whether the prohibition of torture and 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment is really ‘absolute’ in international human 
rights law, and argues that it is not. In this piece, I consider Greer’s arguments 
against the absolute character of the prohibition at law, and find them wanting. In 
doing so, I clarify what the legal prohibition’s absolute character entails, and what it 
does not, addressing misconceptions, and revisit the distinction between negative 
and positive obligations in human rights law. In responding to Greer’s arguments, 
conceptual clarifications are offered which carry significant implications in the 
context of counter-terrorism and human rights law more widely. At the same time, I 
underline that the absolute character of the prohibition of torture and cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment in human rights law does not close off critical 
engagement with the issue of individual (criminal) culpability vis-à-vis the 
prohibition at human rights law, or with the meaning of the terms torture and cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment.  
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Steven Greer has written extensively in a thoughtful and thought-provoking manner 
on the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR). In recent years, he has devoted some of his attention to the 
absolute character of the right not to be subjected to torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of the ECHR (the word ‘cruel’ is 
not included in this provision), and in its variations across other legal instruments 
for the protection of human rights. His critical reflections on this subject have in 
many ways been focused on and galvanised by the controversial judgment of the 
ECtHR in Gäfgen v Germany.1 In this case, the ECtHR’s Grand Chamber found a 
breach of Article 3 ECHR when German police-officers subjected Magnus Gäfgen, 
the kidnapper of 11-year-old Jakob von Metzler, to threats of torture with a view to 
locating Jakob. The kidnapper thereby confessed to having killed Jakob and 
disclosed the body’s whereabouts. He was convicted after pleading guilty, following 
a decision to admit real evidence obtained through his tainted confession, which 
attracted a contentious finding on Article 6 ECHR (the right to a fair trial) by the 
                                                          
1 Gäfgen v Germany, Application No 22978/05, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 2010. 
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Grand Chamber,2 on which I will not dwell. The Grand Chamber found the threats 
of torture to amount to inhuman treatment and demanded adequate redress. It 
considered that there was no room for justifying breaches of Article 3, given that it is 
an absolute right, which means that it is not displaceable on the basis of even the 
worthiest of extraneous ends, such as saving the life of an 11-year-old child.3 
In his latest piece for the Human Rights Law Review, titled ‘Is the Prohibition 
against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment Really “Absolute” in 
International Human Rights Law?’,4 which builds on an earlier case comment on 
Gäfgen,5 Greer takes a stand against what he calls the ‘cardinal axiom of international 
human rights law…that the prohibition against torture, cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment is absolute in the sense that no exception can be accepted, defended, 
justified, or tolerated in any circumstance whatever’, as he sets out in the article’s 
abstract.6 In this paper, I unpack and address his arguments vis-à-vis the prohibition 
at human rights law. In doing so, I clarify what the legal prohibition’s absolute 
character entails, and what it does not, addressing misconceptions, and revisit the 
distinction between negative and positive obligations in human rights law. These 
conceptual clarifications, I argue, carry significant implications in the context of 
counter-terrorism and human rights law more widely. I suggest that the absolute 
character of the prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment 
in human rights law does not close off critical engagement with the wider moral 
debate, including as it relates to the ticking bomb scenario, with the issue of 
individual (criminal) culpability vis-à-vis the prohibition at human rights law, or 
with the meaning of the terms torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. 
 
2. PRELIMINARY CONCERNS 
 
My preliminary remarks concern Greer’s portrayal of the absolute character of the 
prohibition at law. I consider that Greer’s understanding of the absolute character of 
the prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and 
punishment (which I will shorten to CIDT, but without wishing to dismiss the 
significance of inhuman and degrading punishment7), as set out in the abstract, is 
premised on an ambiguity that could be seen as setting absoluteness up for failure, 
in the following ways. When Greer posits that the absolute character of the 
                                                          
2 Ibid. at paras 133-188. The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR suggested that real evidence obtained by 
torture can never be used against someone in criminal proceedings without violating Article 6 ECHR, 
whilst the use of real evidence obtained by other Article 3 ill-treatment may entail violation of Article 
6 ECHR: see Gäfgen, ibid., at para 167. In this case, the Grand Chamber found that the admission of 
such evidence did not vitiate the fairness of the trial under Article 6 ECHR. 
3 Ibid., at paras 87-132. 
4 Greer, ‘Is the Prohibition against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment Really 
“Absolute” in International Human Rights Law?’ (2015) 15 Human Rights Law Review 101. 
5 Greer, ‘Should Police Threats to Torture Suspects Always be Severely Punished? Reflections on the 
Gäfgen Case’ (2011) 11 Human Rights Law Review 67. 
6 Emphasis added. 
7 On this topic, see Mavronicola, ‘Crime, Punishment and Article 3 ECHR: Puzzles and Prospects of 
Applying an Absolute Right in a Penal Context’ (2015) 15 Human Rights Law Review 721; Van Zyl Smit, 
Weatherby and Creighton, ‘Whole Life Sentences and the Tide of European Human Rights 
Jurisprudence: What Is to Be Done?’ (2014) 14 Human Rights Law Review 59. 
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prohibition means that ‘no exception can be accepted, defended, justified, or 
tolerated in any circumstance whatever’, the modal verb ‘can’ could be read as 
connoting possibility as a matter of fact rather than lawfulness. Thus, reading 
Greer’s formulation, one may assume that absoluteness entails that it is impossible 
that torture or CIDT would ever be accepted, defended, justified or tolerated by 
anyone (or even committed by anyone) – rather than the more limited claim of legal 
absoluteness, which is that torture or CIDT is not lawful, in international human 
rights law, in any circumstances.8 The potentially misleading account of what legal 
absoluteness entails is, to some extent, harnessed by Greer. For instance, he puts 
forward the non-absolute character of the prohibitions of torture and CIDT in certain 
constitutional rights instruments – which he considers to be an ‘inconvenient fact’9 for 
those supporting the absolute character of the prohibition in international human 
rights law.  
In other words, Greer’s ambiguous and sweeping description makes a straw 
man of legal absoluteness. There are and will be circumstances in which some might 
defend or even tolerate torture or CIDT. The absolute character of the prohibition of 
torture and CIDT in human rights law does not signify that no such circumstances can 
possibly arise, nor does it purport to reflect unanimous global consensus (I wonder 
what legal prohibition can?).  
Moreover, Greer’s formulation of absoluteness has the capacity to conflate the 
absolute character of the prohibition of torture and CIDT as it applies to the State under 
international human rights law with the contours of the criminal culpability, 
excusability, and shades thereof, of individuals10 who commit such acts, such as the 
police officers in Gäfgen. This is, to some extent, informed by the approach adopted 
by the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR in Gäfgen in relation to the criminal culpability 
of the police officers involved,11 and of which Greer has been critical.12 The absolute 
character of the prohibition of torture and CIDT as a matter of human rights law 
stands in a complex relationship with regards to individual criminal liability, which 
is not coterminous with illegality in international human rights law. I address this 
below.  
 
3. GREER’S GÄFGEN THESES 
 
Greer’s central theses, which he labels the ‘Gäfgen thesis in the narrow sense’ and the 
‘Gäfgen thesis in the broad sense’,13 rely chiefly on casting certain situations as 
conflicts of rights. I will address these in turn by examining the obligations 
                                                          
8 For an illuminating discussion of the interaction between law and morality in the context of legal 
provisions protecting human dignity, see McCrudden, ‘Introduction to Current Debates’ in 
McCrudden (ed), Understanding Human Dignity (OUP 2013) 1, at 47-54. 
9 Greer, ‘Is the Prohibition against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment Really 
“Absolute”?’, supra n 4, at 113. 
10 On this, and the crime of torture, see – for instance – Ambos, ‘May a State Torture Suspects to Save 
the Life of Innocents?’ (2008) 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice 261. 
11 Gäfgen, supra n 1 at paras 120-125. 
12 See, for instance, Greer, ‘Should Police Threats to Torture Suspects Always be Severely Punished?’, 
supra n 5 at 83-84, 86-87. 
13 Ibid. at 106. 
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emanating from the legally enshrined human right not to be subjected to torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.  
The narrow Gäfgen thesis relies on an ideal type ‘ticking bomb’ scenario set out 
by Greer, broadly reflecting the facts of Gäfgen and with any of the uncertainties that 
might normally arise in such a context14 largely absent: 
 
It is known beyond reasonable doubt that the suspect was involved in the 
kidnapping. There is no reason to believe that the kidnap victim is already 
dead, and every reason to believe that the kidnapping is causing torture 
and/or inhuman treatment, and is likely also to threaten imminent death. 
There is compelling evidence that the suspect knows where the victim is 
and adequate reason to believe this will be revealed under pressure. The 
coercion applied to the suspect is limited to the threat of torture and, 
therefore, causes less suffering than that which the victim is reasonably 
assumed to be experiencing as a consequence of the kidnapping. Every 
other reasonably viable option to rescue the kidnap victim has been tried 
and failed. Finally, those responsible for the threat are prosecuted and 
tried by an independent court where, if these conditions are fulfilled, their 
conduct should be excused by the imposition of a lenient sentence or 
possibly, where the threat leads to the kidnap victim being rescued, no 
punishment at all.15 
 
Greer suggests that this scenario encapsulates a conflict of rights, where ‘the right of 
a kidnap victim to be spared the torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and 
the risk of death caused by the kidnapping, should constitute an exception to the 
suspected kidnapper’s right not to be threatened with torture in an attempt to 
facilitate rescue’.16 I note that, in this scenario, Greer envisages the perpetrators 
ultimately being subject to the justice process and the pursuit of some form of 
(lenient) redress – or (with a dash of moral luck) if the child is saved, receiving no 
punishment at all, in Greer’s account.17  
Some clarificatory remarks regarding human rights law and moral 
philosophy are warranted at this point. Human rights law is not necessarily 
coterminous with perspectives from moral philosophy on human rights – and, of 
course, the latter are many and varied.18 In philosophical terms, people’s human 
rights may be viewed as being directly violated through the acts of State agents and 
                                                          
14 The uncertainties involved in the proverbial ‘ticking bomb’ scenario are raised by Luban – among 
others – in Luban, ‘Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb’ (2005) 91(6) Virginia Law Review 1425, 
at 1444. Luban comments on the Gäfgen case itself in Luban, Torture, Power, and Law (CUP 2014) at 76-
78. 
15 Greer, ‘Is the Prohibition against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment Really 
“Absolute”?’, supra n 4, at 105-106 (citations omitted). I note that as Luban points out in Torture, 
Power, and Law, ibid at 77, in the actual Gäfgen case the threats were patently not used as a last resort. 
16 Ibid. at 105. 
17 Ibid. at 106, citing Kramer, Torture and Moral Integrity: A Philosophical Enquiry (OUP 2014), at 288-
309. 
18 See, for example, the diverse philosophical accounts on the foundations of human rights discussed 
in Cruft, Liao, and Renzo (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights (OUP 2015). 
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non-State agents alike – although there may still be a variation in the extent of 
obligations appropriately to be allocated to the State (and similarly powerful entities) 
as against the average individual. Thus, it makes sense in philosophical terms to 
describe the situation in the Gäfgen scenario as one where Jakob’s right not to be 
subjected to CIDT or be killed has been violated by Gäfgen. Even so, this does not 
necessarily disclose a conflict of rights: Jakob’s right is violated by Gäfgen, whereas 
what is proposed by Greer is that Gäfgen’s right not to be subjected to CIDT ought to 
be – justifiably, in Greer’s view – infringed by the State. The duty-bearers and thus 
rights-violators are distinct. Therefore, calling for Jakob’s right to be balanced 
against Gäfgen’s right is misplaced, as the two rights demand acts or forbearances 
from different actors - they are not, as such in conflict.  
In the alternative, and bringing this more squarely into the realm of human 
rights law, which directly binds States, Greer is alluding to Jakob’s and Gäfgen’s 
rights as against the State. But in this case Greer must acknowledge that distinct types 
of duties are at play. On the one hand, there is the negative obligation of the State to 
refrain from subjecting individuals to torture or CIDT, which is the essence of 
Greer’s discussion, given that his title focuses on the prohibition of torture and CIDT 
in international human rights law; on the other, there is the positive obligation on 
the State to take all reasonable measures to protect individuals from being subjected 
to CIDT at the hands of third parties.19 It is very hard to argue that the positive 
obligation on the State is boundless. Whilst I may acknowledge that my right not to 
be subjected to CIDT includes a right, in philosophical terms, not to be raped at the 
hands of anyone – State actor or non-State actor alike – the State’s positive obligation 
to protect me from such ill-treatment encompasses duties to secure my protection 
through reasonable and adequate laws, law enforcement mechanisms and 
appropriate redress mechanisms, but does not extend to providing me with personal 
24-hour protection at all times, in part due to resource constraints and not least 
because this might involve significant invasions of privacy. In the Gäfgen scenario, 
the State’s positive obligation can be unpacked into a number of duties including the 
effective deployment of forces to locate the child, interrogating the kidnapper, 
searching his house, and ultimately (in the specific scenario) seeking adequate 
redress for his wrong-doing. Yet there is no duty to torture or inflict CIDT within 
such a positive obligation to take reasonable measures.20 This is both the legal 
position and, in my view, an eminently tenable moral position.21 
                                                          
19 Shue classifies duties under basic rights as duties of restraint, duties to protect and duties to 
provide – see Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2nd edn (Princeton 
University Press 1996) at 35. See also Fredman, ‘Human Rights Transformed: Positive Duties and 
Positive Rights’ [2006] Public Law 498, at 500. 
20 See Mavronicola, ‘What is an “absolute right”? Deciphering Absoluteness in the Context of Article 3 
of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2012) 12(4) Human Rights Law Review 723, at 732. In 
an alternative argument, Turner questions the efficacy of torture and other ill-treatment towards 
preventing harm: see Turner, ‘Human Rights and Antiterrorism: A Positive Legal Duty to Infringe 
Freedom From Torture?’ (2012) 35(11) Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 760, at 771-773. 
21 Although I do not wish to dwell on the wider merits of Greer’s moral stance in this piece, it is worth 
highlighting that a prevailing issue as regards Greer’s moral position is that he often makes what 
Shue identifies as the mistake of assuming ‘that the only consideration relevant to moral 
permissibility is the amount of harm done’: Shue, ‘Torture’ (1978) 7(2) Philosophy & Public Affairs 124, 
at 126 (emphasis added). 
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Greer acknowledges this framing of the issue, premised on drawing a clear 
distinction between negative and positive obligations,22 and cites authors who posit 
that the negative obligation straightforwardly demands abstaining from ill-treatment 
whilst the positive obligation demands reasonable and human rights-compliant 
measures.23 But he does it little justice. He describes the argument on negative and 
positive obligations as suggesting that ‘Jakob’s right to be rescued from the effects of 
the kidnapping would only arise if Gäfgen was not subjected to torture, inhuman or 
degrading treatment’.24 This recasting of the argument is both inaccurate and 
misleading. Jakob’s right both arises and attracts an extensive range of positive 
obligations imposed on the police with a view to saving him: in the context of the 
ECHR, the State is under duties, in light of Articles 2 and 3 ECHR, which protect the 
right to life and the right not to be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment respectively, to enact relevant laws to deter and provide 
redress or punishment for unlawful takings of life or the infliction of Article 3-
proscribed ill-treatment, and offer adequate mechanisms for implementing these; to 
investigate instances of credible allegations of breaches of Articles 2 and 3 ECHR; 
and to take operational steps to safeguard individuals facing an immediate risk of 
being killed or being subjected to the proscribed ill-treatment at the hands of 
others.25 These obligations would simply not include a duty to torture or inflict 
inhuman or degrading treatment on Gäfgen. That is, positive obligations to take all 
reasonable measures, including operational measures, to protect Jakob would not 
include a duty to act in a way which is absolutely prohibited.26 This is certainly the 
legal position under the ECHR, and for many it would also be an appropriate moral 
position. Indeed, I am not sure that Greer himself is prepared to countenance the 
prospect of the next-of-kin of persons who are the victims of kidnapping or other 
violent crime claiming a breach of human rights in the police’s ‘failure’ to take the 
step of torturing a suspect of subjecting him to CIDT with a view to finding out a 
(potentially alive) victim’s whereabouts.  
Thus, much of Greer’s conflict thesis glosses over the issue of responsibility for 
human rights violations at law, and insufficiently engages with the obligations 
correlating to the rights he alleges are in conflict – a closer focus on these indicates 
that the conflict crumbles. The conceptual clarification offered above, based on the 
distinction between negative and positive obligations, is not only crucial to 
responding to his Gäfgen theses, but also of considerable significance more broadly 
in relation to counter-terrorism. Notably, the idea that the State may have a positive 
duty to act in breach of inviolable obligations, such as the duty not to inflict torture 
                                                          
22 Greer, ‘Is the Prohibition against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment Really 
“Absolute”?’, supra n 4 at 124-125. 
23 See Smet, ‘Conflicts between Absolute Rights: A Reply to Steven Greer’ (2013) 13(3) Human Rights 
Law Review 469, at 475-480 and 496-498; Mavronicola, ‘What is an “absolute right”?’, supra n 20 at 732-
735.  
24 Greer, ‘Is the Prohibition against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment Really 
“Absolute”?’, supra n 4 at 124. 
25 See Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights 
by the European Court of Human Rights (Hart Publishing 2004) at 16-22, 45-46. See, as an example from 
case law, Opuz v Turkey Application No 33401/02, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 9 June 2009. 
26 See Mavronicola, supra n 20 at 732. 
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or CIDT, in order to save lives in the context of counter-terrorism (and beyond) must 
be roundly rejected. The State’s positive duties to protect the lives of persons within 
its jurisdiction do not extend to duties to torture or inflict CIDT. Clarifying this is 
vital – and ensures that human rights do not, through the flawed notion of allegedly 
unbounded positive obligations, become a rhetorical vehicle for their own 
destruction.  
Returning to Greer’s Gäfgen theses: what of the hypothetical scenario, Greer 
interposes, where instead of Gäfgen, the kidnapper is a rogue police officer? Does 
this scenario not disclose the ‘perfect’ conflict between duties of the same duty-
bearer: the State? The answer is not so straightforward. Certainly, in this scenario, 
and with the rogue police officer captured, we could be looking at two instances – 
one actual, and one proposed by Greer – of direct violation of the right not to be 
subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment: one where the rogue police 
officer subjects Jakob to the proscribed ill-treatment; the other insofar as police 
searching for Jakob subject the captured rogue police officer to proscribed ill-
treatment. The State might be held responsible for both.27 Nonetheless, these two 
instances do not straightforwardly encapsulate a conflict of rights. Even if we were 
able to say that the State breaches the negative obligation not to inflict torture or 
CIDT in both instances, the rogue police officer’s duty not to inflict torture or CIDT 
and the duty of the police officers interrogating him not to do the same are not in 
conflict, although the rogue officer’s initial breach of the right has triggered 
contemplation of the second. The only duties that could be said to be in conflict are 
the State’s positive duties to stop Jakob’s ill-treatment and the State’s negative duty 
not to inflict torture or CIDT on anyone, including the rogue kidnapper. But as 
indicated above, these positive duties, which are – appropriately – circumscribed by 
criteria of reasonableness and legality under human rights law, do not extend to 
conduct violating the absolute prohibition of torture and CIDT. Again, there is no 
conflict. 
Greer’s broad(er) Gäfgen thesis, which stems from extending his analysis of the 
‘ideal’ type Gäfgen scenario to human rights more generally, is worth setting out in 
full: 
 
‘Absolute’ rights can and do conflict, though rarely. When they do it is 
logically impossible for each to be ‘equally absolute’; one must inevitably 
be an exception to the other. As with the Gäfgen-thesis in the narrow 
sense, such conflicts can only be convincingly resolved by choosing the 
lesser of the two evils and/or by exercising moral reasoning, intuition and 
judgment in the fullest and widest senses guided by the quest to arrive at 
the result which is most consistent with the underlying rationale for the 
rights at issue. Call this ‘the Gäfgen-thesis in the broad sense’.28 
 
                                                          
27 The State’s direct responsibility may not be entirely straightforward. See Crawford, The International 
Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries (CUP 2002), 
especially at 81-109; and see, specifically, Article 2 and Article 7.  
28 Greer, ‘Is the Prohibition against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment Really 
“Absolute”?’, supra n 4 at 106 (citations omitted). 
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Key to Greer’s broad Gäfgen thesis is the idea that ‘it takes only a single exception to 
an “absolute” rule or principle for it to lose its absolute status’.29 For Greer, the 
Gäfgen case offers precisely this potential exception. Envisaging other scenarios of 
such conflict even between ‘absolute’30 rights, Greer considers that in such instances 
judges ought to engage in a balancing of evils and to opt for the lesser evil of 
violating the more blameworthy party’s rights, or perhaps going for whatever causes 
the least harm, or harm to the smallest number of people, depending on the 
situation. The proverbial trolley only makes one – understated – appearance,31 but 
the broad Gäfgen thesis ultimately advocates pursuing the greater good, or lesser 
evil.  
Again, the broad thesis relies on sketching a conflict which is non-existent, 
eliding as it does the distinction at human rights law between negative and positive 
obligations and the significant and appropriate distinguishing features pertaining to 
each.32 Greer asserts that, given the conflict, affirming and applying the absolute 
prohibition on the State inflicting torture and CIDT in a scenario such as that in 
Gäfgen effectively amounts to a ‘substantive moral choice’33 between conflicting 
duties: not to torture or inflict CIDT on the one hand; and to save an innocent person 
or persons on the other, for example. As such, it requires ‘convincing reasons’.34 I 
address his ‘legal status as moral choice’ thesis below. 
Returning to the plausibility of the Gäfgen theses, Greer’s strongest case, in my 
view, appears to be the hostage scenario,35 and it is worth reflecting on this scenario 
to cast his Gäfgen theses in their best light as legal positions. The right to life, as 
enshrined in provisions such as Article 2 ECHR, allows for the use of lethal force 
against a hostage-taker insofar as absolutely necessary to defend the hostage(s) from 
unlawful violence.36 Now we might contemplate the possibility that, instead of firing 
a shot that kills a hostage-taker, police shoot him in the gut, causing him enormous 
pain, though his life is ultimately saved by medics. Is this not an instance of the 
lawful infliction of inhuman or degrading treatment, given that it inflicts grave 
suffering – and perhaps aims to do so?37 If a gratuitous infliction of such suffering 
would clearly be found to amount to a breach of Article 3 – and it would38 - then 
                                                          
29 Ibid. at 128. 
30 The quotation marks are Greer’s – ibid. at 104. 
31 For a thoughtful take on Gäfgen in light of the Trolley Problem, see Smet, supra n 23. On the Trolley 
Problem in philosophy, see generally Edmonds, Would You Kill the Fat Man?: The Trolley Problem and 
What Your Answer Tells Us about Right and Wrong (Princeton University Press 2015). 
32 On the distinction, see Xenos, The Positive Obligations of the State under the European Convention of 
Human Rights (Routledge 2013) at 57. 
33 See Greer, ‘Is the Prohibition against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment Really 
“Absolute”?’, supra n 4 at 125. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Greer, ‘Is the Prohibition against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment Really 
“Absolute”?’, supra n 4 at 105, 123, 135. 
36 See Article 2(2)(a) ECHR. 
37 In order for treatment to be found to be inhuman or degrading, it is not essential for the suffering 
caused to be intended by the perpetrator: see, for instance, Jalloh v Germany Application No 54810/00, 
Merits and Just Satisfaction, 11 July 2006, at para 82. 
38 See, for instance, Güler and Öngel v Turkey Application Nos 29612/05 and 30668/05, Merits and Just 
Satisfaction, 4 October 2011; and see also Cestaro v Italy Application No 6884/11, Merits and Just 
Satisfaction, 7 April 2015, where the Court made a finding of torture. 
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arguably to make a finding that the lawful shooting of the hostage-taker is not 
contrary to Article 3 amounts to carving an exception to Article 3. That is, this 
constitutes a situation where a conflict of rights is created, and where the infliction of 
ill-treatment proscribed by Article 3 is considered justified. 
This is not the right way to frame the issue, although – frustratingly – it 
appears to have traction with certain academic commentators who see instances of 
justified use of force as amounting to exceptions to Article 3 ECHR.39 As argued in a 
relevant case comment,40 neither the use of force nor the infliction of suffering are 
‘the be-all and end-all of concepts such as “inhuman treatment”’.41 Persons 
withstand significant suffering whether consensually or not, inflicted by third 
parties or not, in multiple contexts, without such suffering necessarily amounting to 
torture or CIDT. Rather, it is a particular form of wrongful infliction of such suffering, 
in a way which attacks persons’ human dignity, which the notions of torture and 
CIDT capture. The use of proportionate – that is, non-excessive – physical force to 
repel an immediate attack on oneself or others does not amount to torture or CIDT in 
that it does not undermine the human dignity of the person subjected to such force, 
whose agency is respected.42 Waldron makes a related point to this, alluding 
primarily to the criterion of purpose. His view is worth setting out in full: 
 
ECtHR doctrine holds that shackling a prisoner is degrading unless the 
shackling is necessary to stop the prisoner from harming others. 
Someone might ask: what is the difference between this invocation of 
an attendant possibility of harm to others, to justify what would 
otherwise be degrading, and (say) the invocation of the danger of 
terrorist attack to justify what would otherwise be degrading treatment 
during interrogation?... 
 
… In the shackling case, what is degrading is the use of chains without 
any valid justification. Once the justification is clear, the element of 
degradation evaporates. But in the interrogation case, we choose 
treatment that is inherently degrading, because it is precisely that 
degradation that will get the detainee to talk…43 
 
Thus there is no affront to dignity or agency in shackling a potentially violent and 
dangerous individual for the purpose of preventing harm to himself or others, yet 
there is one in gratuitous force, or force used for the very purpose of inflicting 
                                                          
39 See, for instance, Harris et al, Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick: Law of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (Oxford: OUP, 2014) 236. See also Smet, ‘Conflicts Between Absolute Rights’, supra n 23. 
40 See, on this, Mavronicola, ‘Güler and Öngel v Turkey: Article 3 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Strasbourg's Discourse on the Justified Use of Force’ (2013) 76(2) Modern Law 
Review 370. 
41 Ibid., at 379. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Waldron, Torture, Terror and Trade-offs (OUP 2012) at 297-298. 
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feelings of anguish and degradation.44  Therefore, as a matter of human rights law, 
the hostage scenario amounts to something more nuanced than a simple conflict of 
rights and the resultant carving of an exception to the prohibition of torture and 
CIDT. 
Another important clarification is warranted, which relates to the distinction 
between negative and positive duties as they relate to the Gäfgen theses. Given the 
emphasis on criminal liability in Greer’s ideal type Gäfgen-based scenario, in which 
he assumes that ‘those responsible for the threat are prosecuted and tried by an 
independent court’,45 I propose briefly to revisit what absoluteness does and does 
not entail.  
As indicated above, whilst in philosophical terms people’s human rights may 
be viewed as capable of being directly violated through the acts of State agents and 
non-State agents alike, this is generally not the case in international human rights 
law, whereby human rights are only directly violated by the State. I point this out 
without wishing to dismiss the significant indirect horizontal effect resulting from 
positive obligations on States to protect people’s human rights. The absolute 
prohibition of torture and CIDT in human rights law entails that every instance of 
the infliction of such ill-treatment at the hands of the State is conclusively unlawful 
as a matter of human rights law,46 in being a straightforward breach of the State’s 
negative obligation not to torture or inflict CIDT. Nonetheless, the question of 
redress via the pursuit of individual civil or criminal liability pertains to the State’s 
positive obligations: whether the ill-treatment occurs at the hands of State or non-
State agents, the duty to provide adequate protection and redress through civil or 
criminal mechanisms falls within the positive obligations to respect,47 protect and 
fulfil human rights, and is appropriately to be delimited by a reasonableness 
standard.48 Some reasonable and adequate redress must be provided in relation to 
Article 3-incompatible ill-treatment under Article 3 ECHR – or unlawful killings 
under Article 2 ECHR, to take another example.  
The findings of the ECtHR in relation to redress in Gäfgen, however, could be 
challenged as having gone too far, by the standards of reasonableness and adequacy, 
in demanding a particular degree of criminal punishment via human rights law; in 
particular, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR found that the imposition of 
suspended fines ‘cannot be considered an adequate response to a breach of Article 
3’, finding such punishment to be ‘manifestly disproportionate to a breach of one of 
                                                          
44 See Raninen v Finland Application No 20972/92, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 16 December 1997; see 
also Svinarenko and Slyadnev v Russia Application Nos 32541/08 and 43441/08, Merits and Just 
Satisfaction, 17 July 2014. 
45 See supra text to n 15. 
46 Mavronicola, ‘What is an “absolute right”?’, supra n 20, at 737, 739. 
47 I note that generally the duty to respect is seen as the negative obligation to abstain from certain 
treatment. Nonetheless, I consider that the duty to respect, within the State apparatus, entails duties 
to take positive measures to avert breaches of the negative obligation by State agents. 
48 On the reasonableness standard in relation to positive obligations under the ECHR, see Mowbray, 
The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights by the European 
Court of Human Rights (Hart Publishing 2004) at 223. 
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the core rights of the Convention’.49 Indeed, there is good reason to suggest that the 
ECtHR must refrain from attempting to draw rigid contours of individual criminal 
liability via positive obligations under human rights law, given that it is neither a 
criminal tribunal nor a law-making body.50 What it is important to take away from 
this clarification, for the purposes of this article, is that any duty to punish 
individuals is not an essential parameter of the absoluteness of the prohibition in 
international human rights law, a prohibition which directly holds States liable for 
human rights violations. 
I conclude on the Gäfgen theses by highlighting that Greer’s accusation that 
the majority of the Grand Chamber was willing ‘to sacrifice the life of an innocent 
child in order to protect his kidnapper from 10 minutes of anxiety provoked by the 
threat of torture to facilitate rescue’51 is inapposite and, ultimately, unfair. I consider 
that the analysis above, which elucidates the type and scope of the relevant duties, 
offers a more nuanced account of the issues at stake. 
 
4. BEYOND THE GÄFGEN THESES 
 
There are other theses within Greer’s contestation of the absolute prohibition of 
torture and CIDT in human rights law. A significant bulk of Greer’s arguments is 
premised on discrediting the idea of the legal ‘absoluteness’ of the prohibition 
through challenges based on varied premises. This is done with a view to affirming 
the substantive moral choice – ‘making intuitively and emotionally convincing, and 
rationally defensible, moral choices’,52 as he puts it – involved in situations which, he 
suggests, amount to conflicts of rights or, at least, moral dilemmas. I proceed to 
consider these arguments, which I will label the ‘legal status as moral choice’ thesis 
and the ‘substantive content as moral choice’ thesis.  
One argument relies on the idea that the absoluteness of the prohibition of 
torture and CIDT under rights such as Article 3 ECHR is not ‘necessary’. Greer 
suggests, in the article’s abstract, that the absolute character of the prohibition of 
torture and CIDT in international human rights law is a matter of ‘attribution’ and 
not ‘inherent legal necessity’. Greer does not explain what he considers ‘inherent 
legal necessity’ – a rather opaque expression – to be, but the point emerges in his 
suggestion that the prohibition of torture and CIDT is ‘formally’ unqualified and 
non-derogable, but not expressly absolute. It is difficult to understand this point, 
given that the absence of qualification and immunity from derogation are the central 
                                                          
49 See Gäfgen, supra n 1, at para 124. On this, see the seminal study on prosecuting serious human 
rights violations in Seibert-Fohr, Prosecuting Serious Human Rights Violations (OUP 2009), especially at 
chapters 2-4, 6.  
50 See Seibert-Fohr, ibid., chapter 4; note her point regarding the human rights position vis-à-vis the 
criminal law position at 147, footnote 232. See also Lazarus, ‘Positive Obligations and Criminal 
Justice: Duties to Protect or Coerce?’, in Zedner and Roberts (eds.), Principles and Values in Criminal 
Law and Criminal Justice: Essays in Honour of Andrew Ashworth (OUP 2012) 135; Tulkens, ‘The 
Paradoxical Relationship between Criminal Law and Human Rights’ (2011) 9 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 577. 
51 Ibid., at 128. 
52 Greer, ‘Is the Prohibition against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment Really 
“Absolute”?’, supra n 4, at 136. 
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constitutive elements of the right’s absoluteness at law – the ECtHR, for example, 
which has pronounced on the absolute character of Article 3 ECHR in hundreds of 
cases, has distilled the following elements as constitutive of Article 3’s absoluteness:  
(a) that Article 3 makes no provision for exceptions – it cannot be lawfully 
interfered with insofar as ‘necessary in a democratic society’, as is the case 
with other, qualified rights such as the right to private and family life (Article 
8) or freedom of expression (Article 10); 
(b) that Article 3 is non-derogable even in situations of war or other public 
emergency threatening the life of the nation, as affirmed in Article 15 ECHR; 
and 
(c) that the prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and 
punishment applies irrespective of the victim’s conduct, that is, ‘whether the 
victim or potential victim is an innocent child or a cold-blooded murderer’.53  
Thus, absoluteness represents this legal non-displaceability of a right such as Article 
3 ECHR.  
A hint of the broader point Greer is making nonetheless emerges in his 
comparison of rights such as those enshrined in Article 3 of the ECHR with those 
encapsulated in Article 6 of the ECHR. Greer suggests that the fact that absoluteness 
is a matter of attribution – and can be revoked by choice – is attested by the ECtHR’s 
qualification of a ‘formally unlimited’ right of access to a court as non-absolute and 
therefore subject to legitimate and proportionate exceptions.54 On this, Greer cites 
the case of Al-Adsani v UK,55 where on a tight majority the Grand Chamber found 
that the bar, on the basis of State immunity, to a civil suit alleging torture against the 
government of Kuwait was compatible with the right to a fair trial enshrined in 
Article 6 of the ECHR, arguing that it was a justified restriction on the applicant’s 
right to a court.56 Greer is suggesting that the same approach can be taken with 
Article 3 of the ECHR, in that implicit exceptions can appropriately be read into it.  
Two points can be made in relation to what I might label Greer’s ‘legal status 
as moral choice’ thesis. The first relates to his use of the example of Article 6 ECHR. 
It is worth, first, highlighting that Article 6 is derogable under Article 15 ECHR, and 
thus does not constitute an absolute right, given that it is displaceable in 
circumstances of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation. As 
to Greer’s suggestion that it has been implicitly qualified on the basis of – arguably – 
‘moral choice’, I would say the following. Article 6(1) provides that ‘[i]n the 
determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against 
him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law’. Whilst derogable under 
Article 15 ECHR, unlike Article 3 of the ECHR which is non-displaceable in the sense 
of being both unqualified and non-derogable, Article 6 ECHR is otherwise not 
expressly qualified in such a way as, say, Article 8 of the ECHR, which allows under 
                                                          
53 Mavronicola, ‘What is an “absolute right”?’, supra n 20, at 737. 
54 Greer, ‘Is the Prohibition against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment Really 
“Absolute”?’, supra n 4, at 112. 
55 Al-Adsani v UK Application No 35763/97, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 21 November 2001. See the 
analysis in Voyiakis, ‘Access to Court v State Immunity’ (2003) 52(2) International & Comparative Law 
Quarterly 297. 
56 Al-Adsani, ibid., at paras 42-67. 
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Article 8(2) for interferences which are necessary in a democratic society in the 
pursuit of certain legitimate aims. Yet what a fair hearing amounts to is a matter of 
interpretation – or, as it has been put elsewhere, specification.57  
In my view, the right to a fair hearing in the determination of one’s civil rights 
and obligations is not properly to be interpreted as demanding unfettered access to a 
substantive hearing on the merits of a legal claim without any procedural barriers. 
Arguably, the right to a fair hearing admits of both the preliminary or procedural 
and substantive stages in adjudication of a claim or dispute. Insofar as access to the 
procedural hearing is not unfairly impeded, it is fair that access to a full-blown 
substantive hearing is, in some circumstances, denied at a preliminary stage, for 
instance on account of a limitation period or not discharging an evidentiary burden. 
As such, what the ECtHR is saying is that access to a substantive hearing is not 
always necessary to fulfil the demand of a fair hearing in the determination of 
someone’s rights and obligations. The proper interpretation of what the Court is 
doing is not that the right to a fair hearing is not absolute, in the sense that it is 
displaceable; but rather that, in specifying the substantive contours of the right to a 
fair hearing, access to a substantive hearing may – fairly – be regulated and 
potentially restricted. The determination of whether the regulation of access to a 
substantive judicial hearing is Article 6-compatible centres on fairness, which is the 
interpretive focus of Article 6 ECHR58 – much like torture, the ‘inhuman’ and the 
‘degrading’ are the interpretive focal points of Article 3 ECHR. I reserve judgement 
on whether it is fair, however, to deny access to a substantive hearing on the basis of 
immunity, as in Al-Adsani59 and the more recent judgment in Jones v UK,60 but have 
considerable misgivings as regards the Court’s findings.61 
The second response to Greer’s ‘legal status as moral choice’ is broader. In 
Greer’s casting of the issues, the distinction between the widespread philosophical 
debate on something akin to the ‘ticking bomb’ scenario, 62 on the one hand, and the 
legal position on torture and CIDT in human rights law, on the other, is eschewed. 
This is the straw man, outlined in my preliminary objections above, kicking in, 
insofar as a lack of total moral consensus on what ought to happen in something 
akin to a ticking bomb scenario is utilised to suggest that the legal character of the 
                                                          
57  See Mavronicola, ‘What is an “absolute right”?’, supra n 20. See, on this, Gewirth, ‘Are There Any 
Absolute Rights?’ (1981) 31 The Philosophical Quarterly 1; and Richardson, ‘Specifying Norms as a Way 
to Resolve Concrete Ethical Problems’ (1990) 19(4) Philosophy & Public Affairs 279. 
58 See supra n 55. 
59 Al Adsani v UK, supra n 55. 
60 Jones v UK, Application Nos 34356/06 and 40528/06 Merits and Just Satisfaction, 14 January 2014.  
61 See Mavronicola, ‘Mavronicola on State immunity and torture: the case of Jones v UK’, Human 
Rights in Ireland, 16 January 2014, available at: http://humanrights.ie/international-lawinternational-
human-rights/mavronicola-on-state-immunity-and-torture-the-case-of-jones-v-uk/ (accessed 21 June 
2016). 
62 For an eloquent discrediting of this scenario, see Farrell, The Prohibition of Torture in Exceptional 
Circumstances (CUP 2013). See also Shue, ‘Torture in Dreamland: Disposing of the Ticking Bomb’ 
(2005) 37 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 231; Luban, Torture, Power, and Law (CUP 
2014) at chapter 4. For a firm stance on the post-9/11 ‘temptation’ to torture, see The Special 
Rapporteur, Statement by the Special Rapporteur, delivered to the Third Committee of the General 
Assembly, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4./2002/76 (8 November 2001); and Rodley, ‘The Prohibition of Torture: 
Absolute means Absolute’ (2006) 34 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 145. 
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prohibition should be reconceptualised as being a matter of moral choice. But even if 
the argument could be made of the moral permissibility of torture in such – 
hypothetical – exceptional circumstances, the fact that there is room for a moral 
debate does not automatically change the absolute character of the prohibition at 
human rights law.63 Interestingly, Greer himself actually envisages the illegality of 
the police-officer’s actions in the ideal type Gäfgen scenario: a legal prohibition at 
human rights law and, indeed, criminal liability for inflicting torture and CIDT, 
remain part of his scenario’s factual matrix, though he advocates leniency in 
sentencing.64 But Greer cannot have it both ways. On the one hand, he puts forward 
arguments towards the idea that the legal absoluteness of the prohibition of torture 
and CIDT hinges on moral consensus and crumbles in the face of dissensus in 
relation to a hard case such as an ideal type Gäfgen scenario; on the other hand, he 
assumes that the prohibition remains firmly in place for the purposes of 
strengthening his moral point in the scenario adopted to push the Gäfgen theses. 
Rather, we can take him to acknowledge that the legal prohibition remains absolute, 
whilst, in his view, the moral imperative not to torture or inflict CIDT is not.65 I 
return to the broader implications of the suggestion that the law on torture and 
inhuman and degrading treatment ultimately boils down to ‘moral choice’ below.  
Greer’s argument that the legal status of the prohibition of torture and CIDT 
should be recast, at law, as a matter of moral choice, is complemented by accusations 
levelled at those who support the absolute legal prohibition. He suggests that: 
 
The Gäfgen case also illustrates how attempting to solve the challenges it 
raises through legal formalism and legal logic alone, risks degeneration 
into ‘legal fetishism’, the attribution of a transcendent, omnipotent, supra-
human quality to what are no more than human-made standards, in order 
to avoid making intuitively and emotionally convincing, and rationally 
defensible, moral choices to resolve intractable normative dilemmas.66 
 
It is not clear what is being described as possessing ‘a transcendent, omnipotent, 
supra-human quality’ – that is, whether it is (a) the law in general, (b) the particular 
legal provision (Article 3 ECHR) in particular, or (c) the absolute character of the 
prohibition enshrined in Article 3 ECHR, which the ECtHR has recognised – or 
attributed, as Greer prefers it – for decades across a rich body of case law. I take it, 
however, that Greer’s concern is to do with (c). I respond to this within the 
                                                          
63 In this vein, see Buchanan on ‘the mirroring view’ regarding human rights at law and morality: 
Buchanan, The Heart of Human Rights (OUP 2013) at 14-23 and chapter 2. I am grateful to Professors 
Shue and McCrudden for pushing this point.  
64 See the ideal type Gäfgen scenario, supra text to n 15.  
65 For a nuanced take on illegality, justifiability and excuse in the criminal context, see Davis, ‘The 
Moral Justifiability of Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment’ (2005) 19(2) 
International Journal of Applied Philosophy 161. On the distinction between crimes and rights, see also 
Farrell, ‘Just How Ill-treated Were You? An Investigation of Cross-fertilisation in the Interpretative 
Approaches to Torture at the European Court of Human Rights and in International Criminal Law’ 
(2015) 84(3) Nordic Journal of International Law 482. 
66 Greer, ‘Is the Prohibition against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment Really 
“Absolute”?’, supra n 4 at 136. 
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framework of the ECHR, but consider that my response is applicable to other human 
rights instruments. As I explained above, the prohibition in Article 3 ECHR 
straightforwardly admits of no displacement – either through qualification as with 
rights such as Article 8 or 10 ECHR, or by means of derogation under Article 15 
ECHR. Accordingly, Article 3 protects everyone within ECHR jurisdiction under any 
circumstances from being subjected to torture or CIDT; and if a Contracting State 
subjects anyone to torture or CIDT in any circumstances, the ill-treatment is 
conclusively unlawful. This is no mere legal formalism – the non-displaceable 
character of the prohibition enshrined in Article 3 ECHR reflects a deep commitment 
to safeguarding human dignity even against the seemingly or actually most pressing 
of extraneous concerns or aims, as has been repeatedly affirmed in cases such as 
Chahal v UK.67  
More than that, the affirmation and application of the prohibition’s non-
displaceable character to the facts of Gäfgen accords with the principle of the rule of 
law, one of the core values on which the Council of Europe is founded.68 Human 
rights provisions have been legally enshrined to safeguard these fundamentals 
rather than to leave them to individuals’ and, crucially, State agents’ intuitive 
judgement in whatever they might perceive as a troubling moral dilemma. In my 
view, it is hardly ‘legal fetishism’ to stand by that; Greer’s position, on the other 
hand, attacks the foundational core of the legal protection of human rights as 
enshrined in the ECHR and other instruments. Human rights law is there to hold 
States to certain minimum standards, and the point of having standards is to impose 
requirements which are distinct from whatever State agents simply feel is the right 
thing to do in any perceived or actual dilemma. 
In Greer’s argument, not only is the legal status of rights such as those 
enshrined in Article 7 of the ICCPR or Article 3 of the ECHR a matter of moral choice 
– so, in Greer’s view, is their content. Greer’s position is that ‘nearly all the canonical 
formulations are in the form of unqualified prohibitions and do not contain any 
express rights at all’.69 Thus, according to Greer, the rights emanating from such 
provisions are ‘implied’ rather than express, and this entails that their limits and 
restrictions are matters of ‘interpretation, choice and attribution rather than necessity 
and inescapable prescription’.70 For Greer, this can accommodate carving certain 
rights out of the absolute prohibition or finding exceptions to these on the basis of 
‘moral choice’.71 
                                                          
67 Chahal v UK, Application No 22414/93, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 15 November 1996. 
68 Founding Statute of the Council of Europe, 1949, Preamble. 
69 Greer, ‘Is the Prohibition against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment Really 
“Absolute”?’, supra n 4, at 111. 
70 Ibid., at 111-112. A similar argument, but particularly in relation to non-refoulement duties under 
Article 3 ECHR, is made in Battjes, ‘In Search of a Fair Balance: The Absolute Character of the 
Prohibition of Refoulement under Article 3 ECHR Reassessed’ (2009) 22(3) Leiden Journal of 
International Law 583; and Greenman, ‘A Castle Built on Sand? Article 3 ECHR and the Source of Risk 
in Non-Refoulement Obligations in International Law’ (2015) 27(2) International Journal of Refugee Law 
264; but cf Wouters, International Legal Standards for the Protection from Refoulement (Intersentia 2009) 
326-327; and Mavronicola and Messineo, ‘Relatively Absolute? The Undermining of Article 3 ECHR 
in Ahmad v UK’ (2013) 76(3) Modern Law Review 589. 
71 Greer, ‘Is the Prohibition against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment Really 
“Absolute”?’, supra n 4, at 125. 
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In response to what I might thus label Greer’s ‘substantive content as moral 
choice’ thesis, I propose that there is a distinction between the delimitation of the 
prohibition of torture and CIDT through the interpretation of its terms and the 
application of exceptions, qualifications or derogations to the prohibition of torture 
and CIDT. The former does not contradict the absolute character of the prohibition, 
whereas the latter would. Certainly, human rights instruments are imbued with 
moral content. They embody deeply moral – and morally contested – concepts 
whose interpretation must be morally engaged. Nowhere is this perhaps more vivid 
than in Article 3, which proscribes torture, inhumanity, and degradation inflicted on 
human beings. These abstract concepts are rich in moral content, whose contours we 
can arrive at through relevant deliberation, not empty canvases which contain ‘no 
express rights’ and on which preferences or intuitions can, without further ado, 
simply be imposed. This does not mean, however, that their interpretation 
constitutes an all-encompassing moral choice, which Greer posits can boil down to a 
greater good / lesser evil balancing act. Their specification, rather, should proceed 
on a principled understanding of the sorts of wrongs they proscribe.72 A purported 
interpretation which amounts to displacement through the back door is not 
committed to such a principled reading of the ill-treatment proscribed. Waldron 
makes a forceful point to clarify the distinction between proper interpretation of 
terms such as torture, inhumanity and degradation on the one hand and 
displacement through the back door (that is, the pretence of interpretation) on the 
other, suggesting that in interpreting these terms:  
 
We are certainly not permitted to follow…a realist logic proceeding on 
the basis of modus tollens: 
(1) If X is inhuman then X is prohibited; 
(2) But because X is necessary, it is unthinkable that X should be 
prohibited; 
therefore, (3) X cannot be regarded as inhuman.73 
 
At the very least, Greer has not made the case for the idea that something intuitively 
targeted to a greater good / lesser evil outcome is not torture or CIDT. Rather, he 
seems precisely to be following the logic criticised by Waldron. 
Another aspect of Greer’s account involves taking issue with the 
interpretation of torture and CIDT and their ‘extension’ to certain actions that do not 
seem, to put it crudely, quite so bad as to warrant unqualified condemnation. He is 
particularly concerned with the idea that ill-treatment falling short of torture, such as 
the threats issued to Gäfgen – amounting to CIDT – is considered to be absolutely 
prohibited. Going beyond the conflict argument, his argument could either be: (a) 
that (cruel,) inhuman and degrading treatment are not wrong enough to warrant an 
absolute prohibition; or (b) that the interpretation of these terms is going beyond the 
proper understanding of (cruel,) inhuman and degrading treatment. I have, to some 
extent, addressed (a) in considering Greer’s argument for carving certain rights out 
                                                          
72 See, on this, Waldron, Torture, Terror and Trade-offs, supra note 43, especially at chapter 9. See also 
Mavronicola, ‘What is an “absolute right”?’, supra n 20, at 746-747. 
73 Waldron, ibid. at 297. 
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of the absolute prohibition or finding exceptions to these on the basis of ‘moral 
choice’.74 There is much more to be said on the subject, but space does not allow this 
to be exhaustively covered in this piece.75 Nonetheless, at times Greer appears to be 
suggesting (b): for instance, alluding to Kant’s principle of treating persons as ends 
in themselves and not only as means to an end, and returning to the Gäfgen case, he 
suggests that ‘the threat to torture is more of a threat to treat someone as an end [sic] 
rather than itself treating them as an end [sic]’.76 
The debate about the proper understanding of torture and cruel, inhuman 
and degrading treatment – and punishment – is significant. Given that these forms 
of ill-treatment are absolutely proscribed in human rights law, their interpretation 
and application in a given case determine the line between conclusively unlawful 
and potentially lawful77 conduct. The line has been hotly contested since at least the 
seminal inter-State case of Ireland v UK, where the European Commission of Human 
Rights found the five techniques of interrogation employed by the UK forces in 
Northern Ireland internment camps to constitute torture, the European Court of 
Human Rights found them to constitute the lesser, but also absolutely prohibited, 
wrongs of inhuman and degrading treatment;78 Judge Fitzmaurice, on the other 
hand, considered that most of the ill-treatment at issue did not cross the Article 3 
threshold at all, and advised the Court not to ‘water down and adulterate the terms 
of the Convention by enlarging them so as to include concepts and notions that lie 
outside their just and normal scope’.79   
More recently, the majority of the Grand Chamber in Bouyid v Belgium80 found 
that single slaps inflicted on persons in police custody amounted to degrading 
treatment; whilst a vocal minority of judges, in dissent, cautioned against what they 
branded the ‘trivialising’ of findings of Article 3 ill-treatment.81 Those in dissent 
expressed concern that the majority’s judgment ‘may impose an unrealistic standard 
by rendering meaningless the requirement of a minimum level of severity for acts of 
violence by law-enforcement officers’ and argued that this unduly high standard did 
not show proper appreciation of the difficulties that police may face in real-life 
                                                          
74 Greer, ‘Is the Prohibition against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment Really 
“Absolute”?’, supra n 4, at 125. 
75 See, however, Mavronicola, Torture, Inhumanity and Degradation under Article 3 ECHR: Absolute 
Rights and Absolute Wrongs (Hart Publishing, 2016 – forthcoming), on file with author.  
76 I believe Greer meant ‘means’ rather than ‘end’ here. Greer, ‘Is the Prohibition against Torture, 
Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment Really “Absolute”?’, supra n 4, at 126. 
77 The qualifier of ‘potentially’ reflects the fact that the treatment at issue may still be found contrary 
to another human right. 
78 Ireland v UK Application No 5310/71, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 18 January 1978. 
79 Ireland v UK, ibid., Separate Opinion of Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice at para 36. 
80 Bouyid v Belgium Application No 23380/09, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 28 September 2015. See 
blog posts commenting on this: Smet, ‘Bouyid v. Belgium: Grand Chamber Decisively Overrules 
Unanimous Chamber’, Strasbourg Observers, 1 October 2015, available at: 
http://strasbourgobservers.com/2015/10/01/bouyid-v-belgium-grand-chamber-decisively-
overrules-unanimous-chamber/ (accessed 21 June 2016); Mavronicola, ‘Bouyid and dignity’s role in 
Article 3 ECHR’, Strasbourg Observers, 8 October 2015, available at: 
http://strasbourgobservers.com/2015/10/08/bouyid-and-dignitys-role-in-article-3-echr/ (accessed 
21 June 2016).  
81 Bouyid, ibid., Dissenting Opinion of Judges De Gaetano, Lemmens and Mahoney, at para 7. 
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situations and which may ‘cause them to lose their temper’.82 Given that the 
situation complained of, according to the dissenting judges, presented a treatment 
that was ‘far less serious’ than ill-treatment in other cases the Court has 
unfortunately had to deal with, this entailed that the Court’s findings and 
conclusions risked ‘being completely at odds with reality’.83  
My brief response to the concerns expressed by the judges in Bouyid is as 
follows. As indicated by reference to Waldron’s point previously,84 torture is torture, 
and inhuman treatment is inhuman treatment, and degrading treatment is 
degrading treatment, irrespective of how frequently they might occur in the 
workings of any State machinery. Moreover, the dissenters’ view of the minimum 
level of severity is unduly focused on harm: as I argue elsewhere, it was the wrong 
committed against the applicants which reached the minimum level of severity, 
rather than the harm endured by them.85 I suspect that Greer might disagree,86 and it 
would be interesting to debate and reassess, for instance, whether threats such as 
those issued to Gäfgen are properly to be seen as inhuman or degrading treatment 
contrary to the prohibition enshrined in Article 3 ECHR. 
Although I addressed this matter above, I wish to reiterate that, beyond the 
conflict-of-rights idea in the Gäfgen theses, a dimension to Greer’s critique of the 
Grand Chamber judgment in Gäfgen which remains under-explored in academic 
commentary on human rights, is the extent to which ill-treatment proscribed at 
human rights law under provisions such as Article 3 ECHR ought to attract individual 
criminal liability and, indeed, particular penalties.87 As I illustrate above, this is a 
distinct issue to the question of the unlawfulness of certain State action under 
human rights law.88 It is therefore misconceived to see it as an essential parameter of 
the absolute character of the prohibition at human rights law, as Greer tends to do. 
Nonetheless, the issue pertains to the delimitation of positive obligations under 
fundamental rights such as the right to life and the right not to be subjected to 
torture or CIDT, and warrants further critical discussion. 
Lastly, I wish to address what Greer portrays as a clarificatory point, in the 
form of a grievance against proponents of the absoluteness of the prohibition of 
torture and CIDT, to the effect that they confuse absoluteness with universality and 
non-derogability. Greer’s grievance demands critical consideration because, in my 
view, it misrepresents the points made and therefore does the opposite of 
                                                          
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid., at para 8. 
84 See supra text to n 73. 
85 See Mavronicola, ‘Bouyid v Belgium: The “minimum level of severity” and human dignity's role in 
Article 3 ECHR’ at 
https://www.academia.edu/18858510/Bouyid_v_Belgium_The_minimum_level_of_severity_and_h
uman_dignitys_role_in_Article_3_ECHR (accessed 14 February 2016). See also the point made by 
Shue, supra n 21. 
86 He makes some allusions to what he considers to be the (comparatively) low severity of the ill-
treatment at issue in Greer, ‘Is the Prohibition against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading 
Treatment Really “Absolute”?’, supra n 4, at 115, 133; see also Greer, ‘Should Police Threats to Torture 
Suspects Always be Severely Punished?’, supra n 5, at 73, 86. 
87 See, on this, Tulkens, ‘The Paradoxical Relationship between Criminal Law and Human Rights’ 
(2011) 9 Journal of International Criminal Justice 577; and the monograph by Seibert-Fohr, supra n 49. 
88 See supra text to n 49. 
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elucidating the issues at hand. It appears that, on the universality point, Greer is 
taking issue with commentators who have suggested that the absolute character of 
Article 3 ECHR demands an autonomous reading of torture and inhuman and 
degrading treatment by the ECtHR in the context of the proposed expulsion of 
individuals to States which are not subject to the ECHR,89 rather than a relativist 
reading which finds that the very same treatment which is inhuman in Europe may 
not be so outside Europe.90  
The prohibition on expelling individuals to a State where they face a real risk 
of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is a long-standing 
element of ECtHR case law,91 stemming from the principle that States must not put 
individuals in a situation which involves an amplified risk of such torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment, whether that situation is to be found in a prison 
cell or in a different jurisdiction.92 The ECtHR has repeatedly affirmed that the 
prohibition remains ‘equally absolute’ in expulsion cases.93 This is what Francesco 
Messineo and I were highlighting in our criticism of a relativist dictum in the case of 
Ahmad v UK,94 where the Court suggested that ‘treatment which might violate 
Article 3 because of an act or omission of a Contracting State might not attain the 
minimum level of severity which is required for there to be a violation of Article 3 in 
an expulsion or extradition case’.95 The particular comment highlights that the 
relativism involved in paragraph 177 of Ahmad amounted to an inappropriate 
specification of Article 3 of the ECHR, and was in fact displacement through the 
back door.96 As concerns the suggestion that some confuse absoluteness with non-
derogability, I only note that non-derogability is an aspect of absoluteness: that is, of 
the non-displaceability of the prohibition of torture and CIDT. It is therefore a 
necessary, but not sufficient,97 as Greer rightly observes, aspect of the absolute 




The above is a brief attempt to elucidate and address Greer’s anti-absoluteness 
arguments in relation to the prohibition of torture and CIDT in international human 
rights law. The three main arguments – the conflict of rights thesis (elaborated 
through the narrow and broad Gäfgen theses), the legal status as moral choice thesis, 
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Application Nos 8319/07 and 11449/07, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 28 June 2011, at para 217. 
93 Chahal, supra n 67, at para 80. 
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96 Mavronicola and Messineo, supra n 70, at 601. 
97 Greer, ‘Is the Prohibition against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment Really 
“Absolute”?’, supra n 4, at 112-113. 
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and the substantive content as moral choice thesis – are unpacked, confronted and 
dismissed. Refuting Greer’s arguments inter alia serves to dismantle arguments that 
there may ever exist a positive duty, in human rights law, to torture or inflict CIDT, 
in order to save lives, including in the context of fighting terrorism. The article 
forcefully rejects the flawed notion of allegedly unbounded positive obligations 
creating conflicts of rights which might compel the State to violate absolute 
prohibitions.  
Ultimately, Greer’s position can be seen as a contribution to the moral debate 
on the ticking bomb scenario. Whilst he attempts to project his views on the moral 
imperatives involved in particular situations of the Gäfgen variety onto the character 
of the legal prohibition – and its relationship with the State’s positive obligations to 
protect individuals’ right to life and right to be free from torture and CIDT – the law, 
and the judges applying it, are likely to remain unmoved; and, in my view, rightly 
so. Without any significant change in the international legal position envisaged at 
this stage or necessitated by virtue of any conflict of rights, his arguments leave the 
absolute character of the legal prohibition of torture and CIDT in international 
human rights law intact.  
